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The Principles of the Japanese Propa-
ganda Campaign against Outer Mongolia

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I. Preface

1. In accordance with the point of view of treating the Soviet Russia and Mongolia as one unit, Propaganda in Outer Mongolia should in its fundamental idea conform with the propaganda principles against the Soviet Union; but in actual propaganda the special characteristics of Outer Mongolia must be taken into consideration. This guide will point out only these special points and give necessary explanation thereof. Propaganda towards Outer Mongolia, therefore, shall in general rules follow the propaganda principle towards the Soviet Union and in its expression follow this guide.

2. In executing propaganda according to this guide, contents and methods of propaganda shall be judiciously selected and adjusted within the prescribed limits, according to the existing circumstances.

II. Propaganda Measures Against
Outer Mongolia

The same measures shall be taken as towards the Soviet Union except the following unique points:

1. The ultimate objective of propaganda in Outer Mongolia is positively to induce the Outer Mongolians to become anti-Soviet, that is, to cooperate with Japan, and in attaining this final objective the propaganda work shall go through something like the following steps:

Stages	Object	Probable Phenomena	
1st Stage	Frustration of public confidence in the present government	1. Wholesale clean-up 2. Cattle slaughter by the people (Delivery evasion)	
2nd Stage	Opposition of the military and the populace against the present government.	1. Out-break of riots and revolts. 2. Oppression by the Red Army	Out-break of a Russo-Japanese war at a certain time.
3rd Stage	Estrangement from and resistance against the Soviet Union, i.e. cooperation with Japan.	1. Numerous riots & revolts. 2. Birth of an autonomous government under the leadership of the Japanese Army. 3. War against Russia	

In each stage of the propaganda work, attempts shall be made, with a view to the ultimate, as well as the immediate objective, at the attraction of the Outer Mongolians, especially soldiers, towards our camps, that is to say, at the obtention of pro-Japanese and cooperative elements.

2. The Outer Mongolians possess peculiar manners and customs, while the standard of their civilization is generally low, being exceedingly inferior to the Soviet Russians though slightly more advanced than the Inner Mongolians. In our propaganda work, therefore, we must have recourse not only to such expressions and instances as approximate to the actual circumstances but also to novel expressions in order to arouse their curiosity.

3. Since Outer Mongolia is a country of a small and weak race, situated in addition between two great powers, Japan and Russia, the inhabitants have a tendency of worshipping the powerful. With view also to their uncivilized conditions, we should as occasion calls, attempt to show off (plainly display or suggest) our might in connection with our propaganda work.

4. For the sake of propaganda effects, the racial similarity between the Japanese and the Mongolians shall be utilized to direct the Mongolians to harbor racial hatred and hostility against the Russians.

5. The Mongolian race has for all ages been emotionally hostile to the Chinese race. Therefore, in our propaganda work no mention shall be made as to the relations between these two countries.

6. Heed shall be given to the fact that although there is not much difference between the Inner and the Outer Mongolia so far as written language is concerned, there is a great deal of difference in the matter of spoken language.

III. Chief Items of Propaganda

1. The Outer Mongolians' deep attachment to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated.

2. The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure downfall of the Outer Mongolia shall be inculcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti-Soviet atmosphere.

3. An anti-Choibarsun atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians.

4. The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand, and the military, the government quarters, and the general public on the other shall be intensified; in particular, an armed revolt by the Outer Mongolian Army shall be instigated.

5. The racial consciousness shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union.

6. We should exaggerate the prosperity of the Mongolian race both in Inner Mongolia, which is under Japan's protection, and in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy,

protection of religions, and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas, in such a way hinting an eventual complete independence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrangement between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union.

7. By propagandizing the feebleness of the Soviet Union, we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer Mongolians.

IV. Explanation of Chief Propaganda Items and General Methods of Execution.

1. The Outer Mongolians' deep attachment to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated. (Corresponding to No. 1 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. The Government of the people's revolutionary party is a general term comprising the party government, communism in Outer Mongolia and the socialistic system.

The communism in Outer Mongolia has been imported in its entirety direct from the Soviet Union, and with no great thought foundation, it is nothing more than an incidental by-product of the people's sympathy with the overthrow of the old feudalism. So, there is no zealous devotees of the thought itself, while the majority of the people show no understanding, no interests.

Again, the socialistic system is not necessarily very attractive to the general public. Only the younger generation knows no other system. As for those middle-aged or aged, the attraction of the system does not go beyond the realization that it is slightly better than feudalism; or rather, it may be admitted that they are internally annoyed at the rapid strides of science ever since the socialistic revolution.

On the other hand, the so-called leaders of the "Choi-barsun" Party, which is now in power, are not only exceedingly anxious to keep up their enormous might and influence, but also are well aware that once they lose power they will be immediately and inevitably massacred. Submitting tamely to the command of the Soviet Union, therefore, they are continuing with their desperate efforts,

by fair means or foul, for the maintenance of their power; in the past they completely subdued all the uprisings that broke out in several occasions and now they have installed their followers in all the important positions. So, their party is most anxious to maintain the status quo, while at present there is scarcely any other power to offer resistance.

But since the post-revolution history of Outer Mongolia testifies that racial opposition would inevitably arise within the party or the army, the foremost emphasis should be laid on the propaganda among party members and army personnel.

(b) General Methods of Execution. Almost identical with the corresponding item in the principles of propaganda towards the Soviet Union.

2. The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure downfall of the Outer Mongolia shall be inculcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti-Soviet atmosphere. (Corresponding to No. 2 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. Strong in racial consciousness and exclusive, the Outer Mongolians have never liked submission to the Soviet Union; but as a result of their habits for several hundred years, they are prepossessed by the idea of absolute obedience to the powerful (or to the feudal lords, in olden days). If we should enlighten these people in this respect, while at the same time carrying out Nos. 5 and 7 of the Items of Propaganda, we should surely succeed in fostering an anti-Soviet tendency.

(b) General Methods of Execution. Giving familiar examples such as shortage of commodities, conscription of men and live stock, increase in imposition, and so on, we should make the Outer Mongolians realize firstly that all these were the result of their cooperation with the Soviet Union. Secondly, unlimited mobilization of men and materials from the unproductive Outer Mongolian land not only for domestic use but even for the defense and existence of the enormous Soviet Russia or even for sending far west to bear the brunt of the German attack would eventually perish Outer Mongolia altogether.

Thirdly, the United States and Great Britain are at present allied with the Soviet Union solely for the purpose of defeating Germany, and once Germany collapses they would be sure to collide with the Soviet Union. In other words, Outer Mongolia, so long as she remains submissive to the Soviet Union, will be subject to Soviet exploitation. These foregoing ideas shall be propagated.

As for party members and younger generation, our propaganda work shall dwell persistently and with novel wordings on the proposition of whether it was the objective of the Outer Mongolian Revolution to cause the ruin of Outer Mongolia through cooperation with the Soviet Union.

3. An anti-Choibarsun atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians. (Corresponding to No. 3 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

Explanation and General Methods of Execution. This part should read exactly the same as the corresponding part of the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union. In particular, among the intelligent Outer Mongolians including those who have studied in the Soviet Union, there appears to be a tendency of thinking highly of Stalin and comparatively ignoring Choibarsun. It is necessary for us to take advantage of this trend.

4. The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand, and the military, government quarters, and the general public on the other shall be intensified; in particular an armed revolt by the Outer Mongolian Army shall be instigated. (Corresponding to No. 4 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. The party government in Outer Mongolia, it is observed, is an exact copy of that in the Soviet Union, that is, the actual power is in the hands of the party itself although the outward execution is committed to government organs and the like.

In the Mongolian society, however, the power of ostensible organs such as the government, the military, and so on has been so overwhelmingly strong since olden days that every momentous question has had to be decided in the form of a joint conference of responsible representatives of such organs.

Also in the Mongolian society there has been traditional oneness of military and civil life, and this is particularly noticeable in the army. As proof of this, we have the cases of the army always playing an active part in the frequent civil wars of Outer Mongolia. Furthermore, the manpower mobilization in Outer Mongolia is growing more and more extensive so that there remain at present only a very small number of men that are purely civilians. Therefore, in order to bring about internal disturbances we must needs approach the army and instigate them to armed revolt (or to semi-bandit activities, to begin with).

(b) General Methods of Execution. As long as the party government continues to exist, bloody clean-ups will never come to an end and it would be impossible to shake off the Soviet fetters. With this theory, side by side with excitement of racial consciousness (item No. 5), we should instigate chiefly military commanders to armed revolt.

5. The racial consciousness shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union. (Corresponding to No. 6 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

Explanation and General Methods of Execution. Under this item no special explanation is necessary. Among the items of plotting and propaganda for Outer Mongolia, the one that has the largest scope of application is the excitement of racial consciousness. With view especially to the extreme stubbornness of the Mongolians' racial consciousness, we should tactfully weave this subject into all the other items of propaganda, for that would invariably awake a responsive cord in the hearts of the Outer Mongolians.

In this connection, however, care should be taken to direct their racial strife only against the Russians, and under no circumstances whatsoever against the Japanese, the Chinese, and so on.

In the case of this item, it is also a great advantage to make use of religion, for in the monotonous life of the Mongolians religion is all but the only thing that could offer spiritual comfort.

6. We should exaggerate the prosperity of the Mongolian race both in Inner Mongolia, which is under Japan's protection, and in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy, protection of religions, and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas in such a way hindering an eventual complete independence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrangement between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union.

Note: This item hardly requires a special explanation.

7. By propagandizing the feebleness of the Soviet Union, we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer Mongolians.

Explanation. Utter failure of several rebellions in the past and hesitation thereafter to plot another in spite of the general public's unwillingness to remain submissive to the Soviet Union and to the party now in power, have been due solely to the belief that the Soviet Union is great and invincible.

So, once we have succeeded, with the help of examples, in convincing the Mongolians of the vulnerability of the Soviet Union, rebellions after rebellions would inevitably occur in utter turmoil, and herein lies the necessity of the item.

The fact, it is apparent, that both traffic and communications between the Soviet proper and Outer Mongolia is extremely difficult suits our purpose beautifully.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section." -- "The Principles of Japanese Propaganda campaigns in relation to Outer Mongolia" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department in Moscow.

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. Tarantenko (signed)
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,
17 May 1946.